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Defendant was charged in four separate indict-

ments with the murder of his wife and three children by shooting them on
the same evening. At the first trial, for the murder of his wife, the jury
affixed a sentence of 20 years. The second trial, for the murder of one of his
children, resulted in a 45 year sentence. The jury imposed the death penalty
at his third trial for the murder of another child. Evidence of all four killings
was received at each of the trials.' The United States Supreme Court held
four justices dissenting, that the trial of each offense separately was not a
denial of due process. Ciucci v. Illinois, 356 U.S. 571 (1958).
The general nile is that conviction or acquittal of one charged with a
criminal offense, is not a bar to his subsequent prosecution for another similar
offense committed at the same time. 2 Some jurisdictions hold that where two
persons are killed at the same time, the result may be attributed to a single
wrongful act, and an acquittal or conviction of the murder is a bar to
subsequent prosecution for the other murders. 3 Other jurisdictions decree
that the "same transaction" test should be applied; 4 others rule that the
offenses must be identical;5 while still others hold that the offenses must be
the same in fact and in law to sustain a plea in bar of former conviction or
acquittal.6
When the problem of joining offenses arises it is imperative that the rules
of criminal procedure be analyzed. A failure to do so may authorize a
motion in arrest of judgnIent,7 or a motion to quash, s which may be sustained, 9
for failure to try both offenses in the first trial. Rule 8 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure provides for a permissive joinder of felonies or misdemeanors which are the same or of a similar character, or are based on

1. Petitioner contended this procedure violated the due process of law clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. It was undisputed under
Illinois law that each murder constituted a separate crime and that the evidence of the
entire occurence was relevant in each of the three prosecutions.
2. State v. Fredlund, 200 Minn. 44, 273 N.W. 353 (1937) (The court stated that,
. . . neither the federal nor in our own Constitution is there any prohibition against
successive prosecutions if the wrongful act is the cause of separate and distinct offenses.")
Jeppesen v. State, 154 Neb. 765, 49 N.W.2d 611 (1951); State v. Martin, 154 Ohio St.
539, 96 N.E.2d 776 (1951).
3. State v. Wheelock, 216 Iowa 1428, 250 N.W. 617 (1933) (The cour stated that there
was no multiple intent); Sadberry v. State, 39 Tex. Crim. 466, 46 S.W. 639 (1898).
4. E.g., Few v. State, 1 Ga. App. 1222, 58 S.E. 64 (1907).
5. Nounes v. United States, 4 F.2d 833 (1925); State v. Corbett, 117 S.C. 356,
109 S.E. 133 (1921).
6. Bossio v. United States,
16 F.2d 57 (1926); State v. Barefoot, 241 N.C. 650,
86 S.E.2d 424 (1955).
7. N.D. Rev. Code § 29-2502 (1943).
8. N.D. Rev. Code § 29-1404 lB (1943).
9. State v. Roberts, 170 La. 727, 129 So. 144 (1930) (Defendant while robbing a store
killed a woman and then her child. On the second indictment defendant pleaded former jeopardy. The court held that this was one continuous unlawful transaction and that it came
within the provision of the Criminal Code, which provided that where two or more crimes
result from a single act, or from one continuous unlawful transaction, only one
indictment will lie.).
10. Fed. R. Crim. P. 8.
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the same transaction. 10 The North Dakota Rules provide that an indictment
or information can charge only one offense.11
The dissenting justices argued that the prosecution had in effect tried
the accused for four murders three successive times. They further stated that
this harassment of the defendant is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
It.might be nated that there are several aspects to this argument that merit
careful investigation. When the problem is viewed in the light of "fairness"
to the parties, the state's unlimited finances place a tremendous burden on
the defendant. Funds are usually available to locate key witnesses no matter
where they are, and the prosecutor may expect greater cooperation from
the police in his jurisdiction12 When this is combined with the power of
the prosecutor to use these unlimited finances to harass the defendant through
repeated litigation it bcomes a dangerous weapon in the hands of a zealous
prosecutor. It might also be noted that it is an unwarranted expenditure of
money and valuable court time to relitigate matters that could just as well be
settled in one trial. It further stands to reason, as proven in the principal case,
that as the number of trials is increased, the chances of the desired verdict
are likewise increased.
Since the principle of due process is generally identified with the concept
of fairness in the procedural aspect, 13 it might be well to note of what
this fairness consists. In deciding this problem, two questions must be
resolved: "Is that kind of double jeopardy . . . a hardship so acute and
shocking that our polity will not endure it? Does it violate those fundamental
principals of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and
political institutions?"14
KEITHE E. NELSON.

FEDERAL
TImELY

CIVIL

PROCEDURE -

APPLICATION

FOR

PARTIES -

SUBSTITUTION

EFFECT
FOR

OF

DECEASED

FAILURE
PARTY

TO

MAKE

DEFENDANT.

Plaintiff brought an action against Sims and Navarra. Navarra then died.
After two years had elapsed, a motion was made to dismiss the action as to
Navarra on the basis of Fed.R.Civ.P. 25(a) (1), which provides that: "If
a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court within two
years after the death may order substitution of the proper parties. If substitution is not so made, the action shall be dismissed as to the deceased
party." The District Court, in denying the motion, held that Fed.R.Civ.P.
25(a) (1) was invalid insofar as it attempted to abridge plaintiff's substantive
right to bring her action to trial by placing a fixed time limit upon her right
to apply for a substitution for the deceased party defendant.1 Henrbry v. Sims,
22 F.R.D. 10 (E.D.N.Y. 1958).
The case presents a striking issue of procedural law. In Anderson v. Yungkau,11. N.D. Rev. Code § 29-1404 1B (1943); but see N.D. Rev. Code § 29-1149 (1943).
12. See Ludwig, The Role of the Prosecutor in a Fair Trial, 41 Minn. L. Rev. 602, 608,
609 (1956).
13. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
14. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 328 (1937).
1. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1952)- United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 590 (1941).
2. 329 U.S. 482 (1947); iofheimer v. Melntee, 179 F.2d 789 (7th Cir. 1950);
Winkleman v. General Motors Corp., 30 F. Supp. 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1939); Anderson v.
Brady, 1 F.R.D. 589 (E.D. Ky. 1941).

